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THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE AND PHYSICAL 
LOCATION: THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF 
WARRANTLESS ACQUISITION OF HISTORICAL 
CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
Matthew G. Baker+ 
It is very likely that the first thing you see in the morning and the last thing 
you see at night is the screen of your cell phone.  Cell phones are owned by over 
ninety percent of Americans, making it the most widely adopted piece of 
technology in history.1  The adoption of new technology always leads to a 
reexamination of how the Constitution protects the public from the probing eyes 
of law enforcement.  The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in 
part that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . 
. .”2  Cell phones are not listed in the Fourth Amendment.  Does this mean that 
the police may search their contents without a warrant or valid warrant 
exception?  The U.S. Supreme Court says no.3 
If the contents of a cell phone are protected from warrantless searches, what 
about a record of the locations where a cell phone has traveled?  The U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have ruled decisively that accessing historical cell site 
location information (CSLI) by law enforcement does not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.4  Despite opportunities, the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
+ J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2017; B.A., The George 
Washington University, 2008.  The author would like to thank Professor Clifford Fishman for his 
guidance and expertise throughout the writing of this Comment.  The author is also grateful to the 
staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their assistance in publishing this Comment. 
 1. Lee Rainie, Cell Phone Ownership Hits 91% of Adults, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 6, 
2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adult 
s/. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  The Court held in Riley that 
the search incident to arrest rule from United States v. Robinson allowing a warrantless search of a 
suspect for weapons or evidence of a crime did not extend to the contents of a cell phone found on 
a suspect at the time of arrest.  Id. at 2483–85 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–
37 (1973)). 
 4. See generally United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884, 890 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 
511  (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 
(5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n 
Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 309 (3d Cir. 2010); see also CLIFFORD S. 
FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 28:4 (2016) (“CSLI 
reveals the cell tower with which the phone is or was communicating at a particular point in time 
and, often, the sector within that tower’s cell.  This provides useful information as to the phone’s 
location, but with several limitations.”). 
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thus far chosen not to hear a case addressing the issue of CSLI and the Fourth 
Amendment.5 
The evolution of technology has always proven challenging to the court 
system. In 2001, the Court developed a rule stating that if a device used by law 
enforcement to surveil a constitutionally protected space, such as the home, is a 
tool that is not generally available to the public, then a search has occurred.6  
Again, in 2012, the Court addressed the challenge technology poses in United 
States v. Jones.7  In Jones, the police placed a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s 
car without a warrant and collected location data for twenty-eight days.8  The 
changes in technology that allow the police to track a suspect’s location through 
his or her cell phone with ease raise significant and troubling implications for 
privacy, which courts are beginning to address.9  Dissenting in a separate case 
in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that the United States may 
have reached the level of dragnet policing when a cell phone provider has to 
develop a self-service website for police to retrieve CSLI records “from the 
comfort of their desks” due to the high levels of demand.10 
The widespread adoption of cell phones is a large part of the reason why CSLI 
collection is such an important issue.  Accessing CSLI by law enforcement is 
not a trivial occurrence that is only used sparingly; in the first six months of 
2015, the major cell phone carriers in the United States received tens of 
thousands of court orders that included demands for CSLI.11  For example, in 
                                                 
 5. See Davis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 479, 480 (2015).  The Court denied certiorari in the 
Davis case, likely due to the decision of the Fourth Circuit to rehear Graham.  Id. at 480. 
 6. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that technology used by law 
enforcement to detect heat emanating from the interior of a house that is not available to the general 
public constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 7. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may 
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”). 
 8. Id. at 402–03.  Over the course of four weeks of surveillance, the police collected over 
2,000 pages of data related to the location of the suspect’s car.  The GPS device was able to establish 
the location of the car within an accuracy of 50-100 feet.  Id. at 403. 
 9. See id. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 
1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010).  Law enforcement officials understand the advantage of tracking 
individuals through their cell phones because the majority of adults own and regularly use cell 
phones, and the capability to remotely track a phone eliminates the problems associated with trying 
to physically install a tracking device on a vehicle.  M. Wesley Clark, Symposium on Electronic 
Privacy in the Information Age: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 
(2007). 
 10. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from rehearing en banc).  
Judge Kozinski noted that while people may mask their movements by traveling at night or in large 
crowds, there is no hiding from the “all-seeing network of GPS satellites that hover overhead, which 
never sleep, never blink, never get confused and never lose attention.”  He also noted the dense 
“honeycomb” of cell phone towers that can be used to track a person’s location.  Id. 
 11. Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC  
(Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-
location-tracking/400775/. 
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the first half of 2015, Sprint received 24,209 court orders,12 Verizon received 
37,230 court orders, 13  and T-Mobile received 47,998 court orders (2015 
totals).14  For the second half of 2015, AT&T received 18,768 court orders and 
for the first half of 2016, AT&T received 16,077 court orders.15 
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided that accessing historical 
CSLI does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Ruling en banc 
in United States v. Graham, 16  the Fourth Circuit held that no warrant is 
required. 17   The Fourth Circuit built from the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc 
decision in United States v. Davis18  that CSLI access does not constitute a 
                                                 
 12. Sprint Corporation Transparency Report, SPRINT CORP. 1, 2 (2015), http://goodworks. 
sprint.com/content/1022/files/TransaparencyReportJuly2015.pdf (court orders include pen 
registers and trap and traces, wiretaps, and real-time location requests.) 
 13. Verizon’s Transparency Report for the First Half of 2015, VERIZON CORP. (July 20, 
2015), http://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ 
Verizon-Transparency-Report-2015-first-half.pdf (including general orders, pen registers, trap and 
trace orders, and wiretap orders). 
 14. T-Mobile Transparency Report for 2013 and 2014, T-MOBILE 1, 4 (2014), 
https://newsroom.t-mobile.com/content/1020/files/NewTransparencyReport.pdf (excluding orders 
for wiretaps, pen register, and trap and trace). 
 15. AT&T Wireless Transparency Report, AT&T 1, 3 (July 2016), http://about.att. 
com/content/dam/csr/Transparency%20Reports/ATT_TransparencyReport_July2016.pdf.  
Smaller cellular telephone companies do not retain the ability to provide the same level of 
information to law enforcement as the larger companies do, and many smaller companies do not 
keep detailed records that separate out the different types of law enforcement requests.  See 
generally Letter from Robert J. Irving, Jr., Chief Legal and Admin. Officer, Cricket Wireless, to 
Representative Edward J. Markey (Oct. 7, 2013) (on file with author); Letter from Benjamin M. 
Moncrief, Director Gov’t Relations, C Spire Wireless, to Representative Edward J. Markey (Oct. 
7, 2013) (on file with author); Letter from John C. Gockley Vice-President Legal and Regulatory 
Affairs, U.S. Cellular, to Representative Edward J. Markey (Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with author). 
 16. 824 F.3d 421, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 17. Id. at 424–25 (“We now hold that the Government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from 
Defendant’s cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Supreme Court precedent 
mandates this conclusion.  For the Court has long held that an individual enjoys no Fourth 
Amendment protection ‘in information he voluntarily turns over to [a] third part[y].’”); see also 
Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Circuit Grants Rehearing, Eliminates Split, On Cell-Site Surveillance, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/10/29/fourth-circuit-grants-rehearing-eliminates-split-on-cell-site-
surveillance/. 
 18. 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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search.19  The Fifth,20 Third,21 and Sixth Circuits22 have also held that court 
orders for CSLI do not require a warrant.23 
There are two principle issues at stake in this debate.  The first is whether 
CSLI is shareable without a warrant by cell phone service providers under the 
third-party doctrine.24 The second is whether warrantless electronic surveillance 
over a long period of time that is undertaken without a trespass violates a 
suspect’s, and society’s, expectation of privacy.25  CSLI should be protected by 
a warrant requirement due to the substantial privacy concerns at stake, such as 
the ability of law enforcement to track an individual’s location purely through 
his or her cell phone. 
Cell phones function by sending a radio signal from the phone to a network 
of base stations or cell towers.26   Cell towers “typically face three or four 
different directions, and each of these individual sides to the tower are known as 
a cell ‘site’ or ‘sector.’”27  These sites “contain antennas that detect the radio 
signal emanating from a cell phone and connect the phone to the cellular 
network.”28  A cell phone that is turned on is in constant communication with 
the nearest cell tower to maintain a connection; there is an exchange of 
                                                 
 19. Id. at 513. 
 20. In re Application of the U. S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 
2013) (“Section 2703(d) orders to obtain historical cell site information for specified cell phones 
at the points at which the user places and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitutional.”). 
 21. In re Application of the U. S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. 
to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In sum, we hold that CSLI from 
cell phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the 
traditional probable cause determination.”). 
 22. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, we hold that the 
government’s collection of business records containing cell-site data was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 23. See id.; see also supra notes 20–21.  The debate over cell phone surveillance is multi-
faceted, and this paper cannot touch on all of the relevant issues.  The use of cell-site simulators, 
commonly known as Stingrays; real-time or prospective cell site location information; and cell 
tower dumps to identify specific phones in a geographic area at a specific time are each an article 
on their own and are outside the scope of this paper. 
 24. See 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 663 n.6 
(4th ed. 2016) (“[C]ell phone users voluntarily communicate this information to cell phone 
companies and it is not unconstitutional for the company to provide the information to law 
enforcement.”). 
 25. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (declining to address whether Katz test would be violated by the 
actions taken by law enforcement absent a trespass). 
 26. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and 
Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 50 (2013) (written testimony of 
Professor Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter Blaze Testimony]; Brief for Elec. 
Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, cert denied, Davis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (No. 15-146) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief]. 
 27. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 26, at 8. 
 28. Id. 
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information approximately every seven seconds.29  The automated process of 
communication between cell tower and cell phone is known as “pinging,” and it 
occurs with no input by the user.30  Additionally, every time a cell phone makes 
or receives a phone call, sends or receives a text message, or otherwise uses 
cellular data, it generally connects to the nearest cell tower and the service 
provider makes a record of that connection and saves it to its servers.31  Due to 
the proliferation of smart phones that can accomplish much more than just dial 
and receive calls,32 the ability of law enforcement to collect CSLI has expanded 
to include information generated when applications, such as email applications, 
refresh in the background when the phone is idle.33 
The fact that different kinds of CSLI are generated by cell phones and 
requested by law enforcement in the course of investigations has complicated 
matters as courts have begun to analyze this issue.  For example, the Fifth Circuit 
and Eleventh Circuit examined cases where the only CSLI collected was 
generated from calls dialed and received.34  In contrast, in a case originating in 
California, the government requested, and was subsequently denied, a court 
order for CSLI that included data points collected from applications running on 
the phone when it was idle and not actively being used by the owner.35  CSLI 
has become increasingly accurate with the proliferation of cell towers, especially 
in urban areas.36  Depending on the density of cell towers, CSLI can pinpoint an 
individual device to a specific room within a building.37  This is a significant 
change from the introduction of cell phones in the 1980s, when CSLI could only 
provide an approximate location over a wide geographic area.38 
                                                 
 29. Eric Lode, Annotation, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track 
Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under Fourth Amendment, 
92 A.L.R. FED. 2D § 2 (2015). 
 30. Lesson Plan: How Cell Phones Work, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2010), 
https://www.eff.org/document/how-cell-phones-work-powerpoint. 
 31. Meyer, supra note 11. 
 32. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself 
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have 
the capacity to be used as a telephone.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Forward: Accounting for 
Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2013) (noting that modern 
smartphones have a storage capacity equivalent to that of a home computer sold in 2004). 
 33. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 
1027 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 34. Id. at 1031 (distinguishing the current case from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits cases that 
examined circumstances using 2010 technology that only generated CSLI from telephone calls, as 
opposed to technology that can collect CSLI when the phone is idle). 
 35. Id. at 1032–33 (noting that the government’s definition of a call in its application included 
any function, both active and passive, that facilitated a transfer of data between a phone and a cell 
tower, to include data from applications running in the background). 
 36. Blaze Testimony, supra note 26, at 46–47. 
 37. Id. at 44. 
 38. Id. at 43. 
672 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:667 
Under authority granted in the Stored Communications Act (SCA), law 
enforcement may request a court order that only requires reasonable suspicion 
to compel a service provider to turn over historical CSLI about a targeted phone 
number.39  Law enforcement has stressed the importance of gaining access to 
historical CSLI during the early stages of an investigation when there may not 
be enough evidence to satisfy a requirement for probable cause.40  The U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have appeared to rule decisively that there is no 
requirement for a warrant before law enforcement can access CSLI.  These 
rulings show that a legislative fix is required to ensure the protection of the 
privacy of Americans. 
This Comment argues that accessing cell site location information by law 
enforcement should require a warrant due to the vast quantity of data available 
when looking at historical locations.  First, this Comment describes the evolution 
of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from a trespass-based test to the 
expectation of privacy test, and how the third-party doctrine changed society’s 
expectations.  Second, this Comment describes how the Fourth Amendment has 
been interpreted in cases involving the tracking of individuals by law 
enforcement.  Third, this Comment describes a series of cases heard in U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals relating to the historical acquisition of cell phone 
location information.  Finally, this Comment argues for a legislative fix to 
require a warrant supported by probable cause before law enforcement can gain 
access to historical location data. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY 
A.  Phone Booths and Betting Operations: The Expectation of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in part that “the right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”41  Prior to the 
1960s, physical trespass was required before a court would rule that a search had 
occurred, as “protection of property rights against government interference” was 
paramount in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.42  The landmark 1967 case of 
                                                 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (“A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the 
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”). 
 40. Geolocation Technology and Privacy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Richard Downing, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. 
of the United States). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 42. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was 
enacted to protect property rights in response to actions of the British prior to the Revolutionary 
War and that courts interpreted the Amendment to protect against government trespass). 
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Katz v. United States43 gave us Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion describing 
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard that has become the bedrock of 
search doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.44  Katz dealt with the placement 
of a listening device on the outside of a phone booth by the FBI that allowed 
them to listen to one side of phone conversations that took place within the 
booth.45  Relevant to Fourth Amendment precedent at the time, the listening 
device did not require any physical trespass into the booth in order to function 
and thus was not considered a search.46   The Harlan Test asks whether an 
individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the activity the individual 
is engaged in, and if society finds that expectation reasonable.47  In Katz, the 
Court stated “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”48 when it 
moved away from the trespass doctrine that had previously governed search 
jurisprudence.49  Relevant to CSLI, the Court in Katz held that people have an 
expectation to be free of a government search in actions that they take, not in 
relation to where they are located.50 
B.  False Friends and Pen Registers: The Third-Party Doctrine 
On multiple occassions, the Supreme Court has held that information 
conveyed by a defendant to a third party has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy, even if the defendant has reason to believe that his confidence will not 
                                                 
 43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 44. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).  In Florida v. Jimeno, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote 
that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” echoing Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Katz and demonstrating that the reasonableness analysis is an integral part of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
 45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348–49 (“[T]he Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the 
recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because ‘(t)here was no 
physical entrance into the area occupied by, (the petitioner).’”). 
 46. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (holding that the use 
of a spike mike that physically intruded into the petitioner’s home was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (holding that information 
heard by use of a detectaphone was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment as any trespass 
necessary to set up the listening device was not material in the use of the detectaphone); Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the placing of a wiretap on the phone lines 
outside of a home does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because there was no 
physical intrusion into the home or curtilage). 
 47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Despite only being a concurrence, and not 
the holding in the case, the Harlan Test has become the bedrock of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding whether a search has occurred in circumstances when there is not a physical 
intrusion onto the property of the suspect. 
 48. Id. at 351. 
 49. Cf. Kerr, supra note 42, at 818, 820 (noting that prior to Katz, the courts adopted a strict 
property rights view of the Fourth Amendment, where a trespass was necessary for a search to have 
occurred). 
 50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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be betrayed.51  The third-party doctrine developed around a series of false friend 
cases that challenged the use of informants to obtain evidence against criminal 
defendants. 52   In United States v. White, 53  a criminal case, the defendant 
challenged the use of an informant wearing a wire while speaking with a suspect 
as violating his expectation of privacy.54  The Court held that White assumed the 
risk that any information he divulged to someone else could be shared with law 
enforcement.55 
In United States v. Miller, 56   The third-party doctrine made a leap from 
conduct involving government informants to conduct of corporations that had 
business dealings with defendants. 57  The Court found that information 
concerning a depositor’s accounts shared by a financial institution with the 
police in response to a subpoena did not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 58   The Court reasoned that bank records, such as checks and 
deposit slips, were not private papers, but rather documents for use in 
commercial transactions that were not protected by the Fourth Amendment.59 
The 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland60 held that a pen-register61 placed on a 
phone line by the phone company at the request of the police did not constitute 
a search under the Fourth Amendment because there is no expectation of privacy 
in information voluntarily shared by a customer with the telephone company.62  
Additionally, the Court held that because customers “voluntarily” share the 
identity of phone numbers dialed with the phone company, they assume the risk 
that the information will be shared with the police because there is no 
                                                 
 51. Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
443 (1976) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). 
 52. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 440 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)); 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752–53 (1971). 
 53. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 54. Id. at 746–47. 
 55. Id. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his 
companions may be reporting to the police.”). 
 56. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 57. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 (holding that the issuance of a subpoena to a third party for the 
records of a defendant does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if a criminal prosecution is 
possible). 
 58. Id. at 440. 
 59. Id. at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit 
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees 
in the ordinary course of business.”). 
 60. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 61. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570 (2009) 
(“A pen register was a device installed at the phone company to record the numbers dialed from a 
specific telephone.”). 
 62. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (robbery suspect dialed the phone numbers on his home 
telephone). 
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expectation of privacy in any information shared with a third party. 63  
Foreshadowing the issues related to privacy concerns and telephones, Justice 
Marshall’s dissent in Smith highlighted that even absent the contents of phone 
calls, the information solely illuminated by the numbers dialed has grave 
implications for privacy as it can provide a clear picture of an individual’s 
lifestyle and habits.64 
C.  Barrels of Trouble and in Hot Water: Tracking Chemical Barrels with 
Radio Transmitters and Using Thermal Imagers on the Home 
In 1983, the Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts65 examined the tracking 
of an individual’s location in the context of the Fourth Amendment.66  The 
defendants in Knotts were suspected of purchasing chemicals to manufacture 
narcotics. 67   With the assistance of a chemical manufacturing and sales 
company, the police installed a radio transmitter in a chemical barrel that was 
subsequently sold to the defendants.68  Using the radio transmitter, the police 
tracked the defendants to a cabin where they discovered a narcotics 
manufacturing lab.69  The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that 
the use of the radio transmitter to track their locations without a warrant was a 
violation of their expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.70 
The Court’s holding was consistent with past Fourth Amendment cases — 
that there was a lower expectation of privacy in the movements of a vehicle on 
public streets.71  The Court equated the use of a radio transmitter to following a 
vehicle on roads and highways using visual surveillance.72  Despite the use of 
electronic means to track the location of criminal suspects, the Court made no 
distinction in the privacy expectation between police following the suspects and 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 744 (“In doing so, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to 
police the numbers he dialed.”). 
 64. Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (highlighting the potential for a chilling effect on First 
Amendment rights by those fearful of government surveillance of telephone data). 
 65. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 66. Id. at 277. 
 67. Id. at 278. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 278–79. 
 70. Id. at 279 (noting that the Eighth Circuit held that the warrantless tracking of the chemical 
barrel was a violation of the defendants’ expectation of privacy). 
 71. Id. at 281; see, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583, 590 (1974).  In his concurrence in Rakas, Justice Powell noted “[n]othing is better established 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the distinction between one’s expectation of privacy in 
an automobile and one’s expectation when in other locations.”  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153–54 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
 72. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (“A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.  It travels 
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” (quoting 
Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590)). 
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the use of a radio transmitter to track the location of a barrel of chemicals in the 
suspects’ possession.73 
The following year, the Court heard United States v. Karo,74 which built upon 
the holding in Knotts, but established important limits in the use of radio 
transmitters to track the locations of criminal suspects. 75   In circumstances 
similar to Knotts, the government received information that criminal suspects 
intended to purchase chemicals to manufacture narcotics.76  With the assistance 
of the business selling the chemicals, the government installed a radio 
transmitter in one of the chemical barrels.77  The government used the radio 
transmitter to track the chemical barrels and the suspects to a number of different 
locations, including public storage facilities and private residences. 78   In a 
notable departure from Knotts, prior to the execution of a search warrant on the 
residence where the government believed narcotics were located, the 
government verified that the chemical barrel was inside the house through the 
use of the radio transmitter.79 
The Court held that there were significant privacy concerns implicated with 
tracking items within a residence.  It held that the surreptitious use of a radio 
transmitter to verify the location of an item at a particular time was a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment because law enforcement could not verify the 
information by visual observation from outside the curtilage of the home.80 
In 2001, the Court ruled on Kyllo v. United States81 and developed a rule to 
help deal with changes in technology and its effects on the Fourth Amendment.82  
Under suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana inside his home, 
federal agents used a thermal imaging device to measure the temperature of the 
                                                 
 73. Id. at 282 (noting that the use of a beeper to track the barrel is no different than using 
visual surveillance to follow it on public roads). 
 74. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 75. Id. at 713–15. 
 76. Id. at 708. 
 77. Id.  With the help of an informant, the government substituted one of the barrels with a 
barrel of their own that contained a radio transmitter.  Using a combination of visual surveillance 
and the radio transmitter, the government tracked the location of the barrel.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 708–10.  The Court took particular offense at the use of the beeper within the home 
of the suspect, noting, “[P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects 
privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly 
one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”  Id. at 714. 
 79. Id. at 709–10.  The government used the installed radio transmitter over the course of 
three days to verify that the chemical barrels were still located in the house of the suspects.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 714–15.  The curtilage is defined as an area near the home that is “so intimately tied 
to the home itself” that it is given the same protection as if it was within the home.  United States 
v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 81. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 34 (holding that the use of technology not generally available to the public to gather 
information regarding the interior of the home is a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
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outside of the home to determine if excessive heat was emanating from it.83  
Based off of the temperature readings and other information, the government 
secured a search warrant and discovered a marijuana growing operation.84  The 
Court determined that the use of the thermal imager on the outside of the home 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.85  The Court recognized that 
changing technology affected privacy and that the law had to adapt to ensure 
constitutional protections.86  The Court developed a rule stating that the use of 
technology that is not in common usage by the public to learn details of the 
home, unknowable without a physical intrusion, is considered a search and 
presumed to be unreasonable without a warrant.87 
D.  Search in the Age of Phones and GPS: Jones and Riley 
The Court began to address the privacy implications of tracking the 
movements of individuals in United States v. Jones,88 when it heard a case 
concerning the use of a GPS tracker by the police to follow a drug-dealing 
suspect for twenty-eight days.89  The majority focused on the physical actions of 
law enforcement when installing the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s 
vehicle; the police meaningfully interfered with the property rights of the 
defendant in violation of the trespass doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.90  
Justice Sotomayor emphasized in her concurrence that the ability to easily 
collect and store vast quantities of location data about an individual without a 
warrant could have grave consequences for the freedom of expression and 
association if the public believes that the government is closely tracking their 
movements, and could very easily be susceptible to abuse by the police.91 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, on the other hand, focused on how long a time 
period the police can track an individual without a warrant before it becomes 
unreasonable.92  Justice Alito argued that there is an expectation from the public 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 29–30.  The government took temperature readings of the suspect’s house and 
neighboring houses for comparison.  Id. at 30. 
 84. Id. at 30. 
 85. Id. at 40. 
 86. Id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens 
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”). 
 87. Id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, 
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
 88. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 89. Id. at 402–03. 
 90. Id. at 404–05 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information.  We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
 91. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect 
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
 92. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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that the police would not secretly track the movements of an individual for four 
weeks without a warrant.93  While he did not suggest a bright line rule of how 
long is too long, he stated unequivocally that four weeks is too long.94  In a likely 
prelude to issues related to location tracking of cell phones, Justice Alito 
highlighted that placing a GPS device on a car is not necessary for the police to 
track an individual’s every movement.95  Modern cell phones come equipped 
with GPS devices, and even older cell phones can be tracked through their 
interaction with cell towers.96 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones seems to cautiously embrace the 
idea of the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment when she described the 
complete picture of a person’s life that GPS monitoring can convey to law 
enforcement. 97   The mosaic theory states that the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated when law enforcement collects too much information without a 
warrant;98 each incremental step may be constitutional, but taken together as a 
whole, they violate the Fourth Amendment. 99   The mosaic theory allows 
information that may appear unimportant to the uniformed viewer to appear of 
great importance to someone with a complete understanding of the context in 
which the information was collected.100  Critics of the mosaic theory point out 
the inherent inconsistencies that will occur when judges are required to 
determine how much information is too much on a case-by-case basis, and that 
any arbitrary bright line rule will either be over inclusive or under inclusive.101 
While not directly tied to location data found through cell phone interaction 
with cell towers, the 2014 case of Riley v. California102 marked a change in how 
cell phones are perceived by the courts.103  Riley came before the Court on a 
challenge to law enforcement’s ability to search cell phones during a search 
incident to arrest. 104   The Court held that in the absence of exigent 
                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle 
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”). 
 95. Id. at 428. 
 96. Id. at 428–29 (“The availability and use of these and other new devices will continue to 
shape the average person’s expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.”). 
 97. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”). 
 98. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 
71 (2013). 
 99. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 
(2012). 
 100. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985); Gray & Citron, supra note 98, at 71–72. 
 101. Gray & Citron, supra note 98, at 71. 
 102. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 103. Id. at 2485 (noting the difference between the search of an individual incident to arrest 
and the search of a cell phone during an arrest). 
 104. Id. at 2484.  Chimel v. California in 1969 and United States v. Robinson in 1973 defined 
the scope of a search incident to arrest.  The holding in Chimel stated that the police may search a 
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circumstances, it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for the police to 
search a cell phone incident to arrest without a warrant.105  The Court reasoned 
that the search incident to arrest doctrine was developed to ensure a police 
officer’s safety during an arrest, and that there was little chance of the digital 
contents of a cell phone posing any danger to police.106  The Court also noted 
that there are significant privacy concerns in allowing the police to search the 
digital contents of a cell phone without a warrant, in light of the large quantities 
of data that can easily be stored on modern cell phones.107 
E.  Legislating Electronic Searches: The Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act 
Against the backdrop of the changing requirements of search doctrine under 
the Fourth Amendment, Congress passed the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986.108  Title II of the ECPA is known as the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), which governs police conduct in relation to 
accessing information from communications providers about subscribers. 109  
Section 2703(d) of the SCA mandates that police apply for court orders to gain 
access to any stored records held by communications providers. 110   Law 
enforcement officers (local, state, and federal) need only a reasonable suspicion 
that stored noncontent communications or information stored by a 
communications provider is relevant and material to a criminal investigation.111  
The SCA does not require that the government show probable cause in order to 
access CSLI.  All that is needed is a showing of “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that criminal activity is 
associated with the communications records sought by police.112  The SCA does 
                                                 
suspect’s person and immediate grabbing area for weapons or evidence to ensure officer safety and 
prevent the destruction of evidence.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).  Robinson 
further defined the rule by allowing police to conduct a more thorough search of a suspect even if 
there is no immediate concern for the loss of evidence.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
236 (1973). 
 105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 106. Id. at 2484–85 (holding that the potential for destruction of evidence or harm to police is 
unlikely in the context of digital data stored on a cell phone). 
 107. Id. at 2489 (noting that the storage capacity of modern cell phones makes them more akin 
to computers than standard phones and that they can store immense quantities of data). 
 108. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Bob Davis, Eavesdropping Looms as a 
Problem as Cellular-Telephone Use Widens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1986, at 31. 
 109. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 110. Id. § 2703(d). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.; Lode, supra note 29, § 2.  The standard required for a section 2703(d) order is 
significantly broader than that required for a warrant.  Law enforcement may seek “any information 
that is materially relevant to an ongoing investigation.”  Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data 
and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 696 (2011).  This 
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not specifically state that CSLI falls under its jurisdiction, which is 
understandable as the statute was passed in 1986 prior to the wide proliferation 
of cell phones.113  The information about a user collected by a communications 
provider includes the location of each cell phone tower that a user connects to 
when making or receiving phone calls and sending or receiving text messages.114 
Despite the lack of a warrant requirement, or more likely because of it, state 
legislatures have begun passing their own versions of the ECPA that mandate a 
warrant for access to CSLI.115  In early October 2015, California became the 
largest state to pass its own version of the ECPA, the California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which mandates a warrant for state 
law enforcement access to any CSLI, as well as metadata and information stored 
on a device or in the cloud.116  The passage of state data privacy laws are 
important because, while state statutes are not dispositive of the issue, they give 
an idea of what citizens of the states are willing to find reasonable.117 
F.  Reasonable Grounds vs. Probable Cause 
In order to access CSLI, law enforcement is required to obtain a court order 
under the SCA.118  The SCA merely requires a showing of specific facts that 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable belief by law enforcement that the 
                                                 
broad standard could allow the acquisition of data unrelated to the evidence of a crime that will aid 
the investigation in some manner.  Id. at 696–97. 
 113. At the time of the passage of the Stored Communications Act, cell phones had only been 
on the commercial market for three years and were not readily available to the public due to their 
prohibitive cost.  See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register with Caller Identification Device Cell Site Location Auth. on a Cellular Tel., 2009 WL 
159187, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2009). 
 114. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy and 
Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Mark 
Eckenwiler, Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP). 
 115. See generally Shahid Buttar, California Leads the Way in Digital Privacy, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/california-leads-way-
digital-privacy. 
 116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1 (West 2016); see also Kim Zetter, California Now Has the 
Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED MAGAZINE (Oct. 8, 2015, 9:58 PM), http://www. 
wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/ (noting that California is the 
first state to protect location data, content, metadata, and device searches). 
 117. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
decisions of state courts while not conclusive evidence, are indicative of societal understanding); 
see also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 865–66 (Mass. 2014) (holding that using 
CSLI to track a suspect’s cell phone for two weeks without a warrant, but with a 2703(d) order, 
constituted an unlawful search).  On remand the district court, and subsequently the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, held that the police had probable cause to obtain the historical CSLI and that the 
evidence could be admitted at trial.  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 35 N.E.3d 688, 697–98 (Mass. 
2015). 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
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information sought is relevant or material to an ongoing investigation.119  This 
is a lower standard than the requirement for a search warrant, which must be 
supported by probable cause.120  The courts have interpreted probable cause to 
mean that police, using the facts available to them, have a reasonable belief that 
contraband or evidence of a crime is present in the place to be searched.121 
G.  Circuit Courts and CSLI: Where We Stand Today 
Five U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have heard challenges to the warrantless 
collection of CSLI by law enforcement.122  All have ruled that the acquisition of 
historical location information does not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 123   Panels of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits ruled that the 
collection of CSLI constituted a search; the decisions were vacated and reheard 
en banc.124  On rehearing, both courts reversed themselves and held that CSLI 
acquisition did not require a warrant.125  In April 2016, the Sixth Circuit ruled, 
in United States v. Carpenter,126 that the government does not need a warrant to 
acquire CSLI in the course of an investigation.127  The Sixth Circuit based its 
holding on the third-party doctrine; specifically, that CSLI constitutes business 
records created by the cell phone carrier.128  The court reasoned that any cell 
phone customer must know that when a cell phone is used it connects to the 
                                                 
 119. Id. 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 121. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983)). 
 122. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 123. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 360–61; Davis, 785 F.3d at 518; Application of the U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615; Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a 
Provider to Disclose, 620 F.3d at 313; see also Meyer, supra note 11. 
 124. United States v. Graham, 624 F. App’x 75, 75 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted en banc, 
Graham, 796 F.3d at 360–61 (“Specifically, we conclude that the government’s procurement and 
inspection of Appellants’ historical CSLI was a search, and the government violated Appellants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in this search without first securing a judicial warrant based 
on probable cause.”); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In short we 
hold that cell site location information is within the subscriber’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”). 
 125. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Applying the third-party 
doctrine, consistent with controlling precedent, we can only conclude that the Fourth Amendment 
did not protect Sprint/Nextel’s records of Defendant’s CSLI.”); Davis, 785 F.3d at 513 (“Following 
controlling Supreme Court precedent most relevant to this case, we hold that the government’s 
obtaining a § 2703(d) court order for production of MetroPCS’s business records at issue did not 
constitute a search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Davis.”). 
 126. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 127. Id. at 890. 
 128. Id. at 888–89. 
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nearest cell tower and conveys his location for use by the cellular provider.  As 
such, Smith was binding precedent that the court was required to follow.129 
The Third Circuit ruled in 2010 on an appeal of a denied application for an 
order under section 2703(d) of the SCA and held that the reasonable articulable 
facts standard in the statute was sufficient to justify release of the CSLI.130  
While the Third Circuit ultimately sided with the government and vacated the 
magistrate judge’s denial of a section 2703(d) order, the court noted that the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s brief argued that a cellular phone user does not 
voluntarily share location information with a service provider in any meaningful 
way.131  The court’s decision ultimately rested on statutory construction instead 
of privacy grounds, but it did note that Federal Communications Commission 
regulations mandated that by 2012 phone carriers have the ability to locate 
phones within 100 meters for 67% of calls and within 300 meters for 95% of 
calls.132 
In a similar circumstance in 2013, the Fifth Circuit held that a magistrate judge 
did not have the discretion under the SCA to require a warrant when the 
government sought access to sixty days of CSLI generated when the phone both 
sent a signal for a call and was in an idle state.133  The Fifth Circuit crafted its 
decision to sidestep the constitutional issues and focused solely on the statutory 
construction of the SCA by holding that, so long as the government met the 
statutory burden of proof, then the application could not be denied.134  The 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits made en banc decisions that are the most 
prominent defenses of warrantless acquisition of CSLI through implication of 
the third-party doctrine by holding that any location data shared with the cell 
phone carrier by the customer has no expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.135 
                                                 
 129. Id. at 888. 
 130. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. 
to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
 131. Id. at 317–18 (“[T]he only information that is voluntarily and knowingly conveyed to the 
phone company is the number that is dialed and there is no indication to the user that making that 
call will also locate the caller; when a cell phone user receives a call, he hasn’t voluntarily exposed 
anything at all.” (quoting Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 26, at 21)). 
 132. Id. at 317–18 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2016)). 
 133. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 
2013); In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 134. Application for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (holding that so long as the 
government meets the statutory standard of the Stored Communications Act, then a magistrate 
judge does not have the choice to deny an application for a CSLI order). 
 135. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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II.  ANALYZING THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND FOURTH CIRCUIT CONCLUSIONS 
A.  The Eleventh Circuit Sides With the Third-Party Doctrine 
The most prominent case holding that the collection of CSLI does not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment is the en banc rehearing of 
United States v. Davis.136  Quartavius Davis was convicted of armed robbery 
stemming from seven robberies that took place between August and October 
2010 in the Miami, Florida area.137  In addition to eyewitness testimony, the 
prosecution introduced evidence that purported to show cell phone activity by 
Davis in close proximity to the locations of six of the seven robberies around the 
time the crimes were committed.138 
In Davis, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that the collection of CSLI by 
the police without a warrant was a violation of Davis’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. 139   The Davis panel used the reasoning from Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in Jones to rule that Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the location of his cell phone.140  The panel pointed out that while there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in committing a crime, in this case the location 
data only showed that Davis was in the area of where a crime was committed.141  
Under that logic, Davis could be implicated for being near the scene of any crime 
that is committed nearby or near any number of locations in which he wished to 
keep his presence private.142 
The Davis panel distinguished Davis’ case from Jones by noting that in this 
case the tracking device was not just in Davis’ automobile, as it was in Jones, 
but essentially on his person, as a cell phone tends to travel wherever its owner 
goes.143  An event that a person believed to be private, such as a visit to a doctor 
or a rendezvous with a mistress, could suddenly be public thanks to government 
access to CSLI. 144   Because very private information could potentially be 
discovered in the course of cell phone tracking, the court held that there was no 
need for a mosaic of location information to be collected before there was an 
expectation of privacy; individual data points required protection.145 
                                                 
 136. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511.  The en banc court noted that the call records at issue belonged to 
the phone company for their own business purposes, not to the customer, and that there was no 
expectation of privacy in a customer’s phone knowingly transmitting a caller’s location to the 
nearest cell tower in order to make a call.  Id. 
 137. Id. at 500. 
 138. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 139. Id. at 1217.  (“In short, we hold that cell site location information is within the subscriber’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 140. Id. at 1215. 
 141. Id. at 1216. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1215–16 (“Thus, the exposure of the cell site location information can convert what 
would otherwise be a private event into a public one.”). 
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Following the decision of the three-judge panel in 2014, the Eleventh Circuit 
reheard the case en banc following an appeal by the government.146  On appeal, 
the court held that Davis had no expectation of privacy in the data collected by 
his cell phone company each time he made a call due to the third party 
doctrine.147  The court held that the third party doctrine from Smith and Miller 
controlled in this case, as Davis had no ability to assert ownership over the 
business records collected by his cell phone company.148  The en banc court 
distinguished Davis’ case from Jones by noting that the data collected by CSLI 
was significantly less accurate than a GPS device placed on a vehicle, and noted 
that a section 2703(d) order under the SCA required a level of judicial scrutiny 
to prevent government abuse. 149    Following the reversal of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s panel ruling, Davis petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.150  The Court denied certiorari in November 2015.151 
B.  The Fourth Circuit Follows the Lead of the Eleventh Circuit 
In April 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that 
no warrant is required when law enforcement seeks CSLI information under the 
SCA.152  The en banc ruling reversed a Fourth Circuit decision from August 
2015 that ruled the collection of CSLI by the police without a warrant was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.153  In circumstances similar to Davis,154 
Aaron Graham was convicted of committing six armed robberies in and around 
Baltimore, Maryland.155  During the investigation, police obtained a court order 
for CSLI records from July 2010 to February 2011, for a total of 221 days.156  
This data contained 20,235 individual location data points related to Graham’s 
and his co-defendant’s locations. 157   The district court denied a motion to 
suppress the CSLI evidence because the judge held that CSLI constitutes 
business records under the third-party doctrine and there is no expectation of 
privacy in records voluntarily shared with a third party.158  The district court 
judge ruled that based on no clear judicial decision on the constitutionality of 
                                                 
 146. United States v. Davis, 573 Fed. App’x 925, 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (reh’g granted en banc 
and vacated). 
 147. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 515–17 (distinguishing CSLI from GPS to determine the location of a target). 
 150. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (No. 15-146). 
 151. Davis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 479, 480 (2015). 
 152. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 153. See id. at 424–25. 
 154. Davis, 785 F.3d at 500. 
 155. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338–39 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 156. Id. at 341. 
 157. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D. Md. 2012). 
 158. Id. at 389 (“[C]ourts have concluded that because people voluntarily convey their cell site 
location data to their cellular providers, they relinquish any expectation of privacy over those 
records.”). 
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collecting CSLI without a warrant, the SCA provided adequate privacy 
protections.159  Echoing Justice Alito in Jones, the court held that changing 
technological circumstances was an issue for the legislative branch to address.160 
The initial panel of the Fourth Circuit based its holding in part on disagreeing 
with the district court’s reading of Graham’s cellular service provider’s privacy 
policy that each subscriber must agree to in order to have cell phone service.161  
The policy stated that the company collected information related to when a 
device was in use, how it was functioning, what websites were visited, and where 
it was located.162  The court discounted that the privacy policy served as a 
notification removing Graham’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements and location for two reasons: (1) the policy said nothing about 
sharing any CSLI with the government, and (2) subscribers rarely read terms of 
service; thus, companies cannot expect the privacy policy to serve as notice of a 
lack of privacy.163  The court distinguished the case from the third-party doctrine 
cases of Smith and Miller by noting that Graham and his co-conspirators did not 
voluntarily convey their CSLI to their service providers.164 
Rehearing the case en banc, the full court held that the third-party doctrine 
controlled and did not require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before 
accessing CSLI.165  The court stated that the holdings in Karo, Kyllo, and Jones 
all involved actions taken by the government without the assistance of third 
parties and could not provide any insight into whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information provided by third parties.166  The court 
emphasized that its holding was in agreement with every other Circuit Court that 
had heard similar cases and that the defendant’s theory of how the government 
violated the Fourth Amendment was never adopted by other courts.167  The 
defendant argued that an individual must “voluntarily convey” information to a 
third party and that in the context of CSLI there was no information affirmatively 
                                                 
 159. Id. at 389–90 (“Congress in enacting the [SCA], has chosen to require only ‘specific and 
articulable facts’ in support of a government application for such records.”). 
 160. Id. at 390. 
 161. Graham, 796 F.3d at 345. 
 162. Id. (The Sprint/Nextel privacy policy stated, in part, that the “[i]nformation we collect 
when we provide you with Services includes . . . where [your device] is located . . . .”). 
 163. Id. (“First, the policy only states that Sprint/Nextel collects information about the phone’s 
location—not that it discloses this information to the government. . . . Second, studies have shown 
that users of electronic communications services often do not read or understand their providers’ 
privacy policies.”). 
 164. Id. at 352–54.  The court noted that CSLI is not conveyed by a customer to the cell phone 
provider, and the information is automatically generated when a call is placed or received.  The 
automatic generation of the CSLI signals an involuntary act that does not implicate the third-party 
doctrine.  Id. at 354. 
 165. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424–25 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he third-party 
doctrine . . . applies even when ‘the information is revealed’ to a third-party, as it assertedly was 
here.”). 
 166. Id. at 426. 
 167. Id. at 428. 
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conveyed by the cell phone customer to the cell phone provider.168  The court 
rejected this approach in favor of the idea that the customer conveys CSLI to the 
provider when the cell phone exchanges signals with the nearest cell tower.169  
The court did not address what actions—automatic or otherwise—a customer 
must take to convey a signal to a cell tower. 
C.  Analyzing the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit Third-Party Doctrine 
Rationales 
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuit en banc decisions relied solely on the fact 
that precedent under the third-party doctrine controls the ability of the 
government to access information voluntarily conveyed to a third party.170  In 
Davis, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the holdings in Miller and Smith to show 
that the creation of CSLI by a service provider is akin to the retention of bank 
documents or the use of a pen-register to track numbers dialed by a specific 
phone line.171  The court’s analysis relied on the fact that Davis voluntarily 
shared his location with his service provider, and thus implicated the third-party 
doctrine each time he made a call by the physical act of dialing or answering a 
phone call.172 
The Fourth Circuit relied on the same rationale when it reheard Graham en 
banc, stating explicitly that the third-party doctrine controlled and that the court 
was bound by Supreme Court precedent.173  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit 
contrasted the purely governmental actions in Jones with the records collection 
by the cell phone companies to show that while there may be an expectation of 
privacy in government data collection, it cannot prevent the sharing of 
information collected and maintained by third parties.174 
                                                 
 168. Id. at 429.  The dissent notes that every third-party doctrine case contains two distinct sets 
of action taken by defendants: (1) “knowledge of particular information,” and (2) “an action 
submitting that information.”  Id. at 443.  The dissent argues that those two steps are missing from 
the facts in Graham as it is unclear what knowledge cell phone users have of the conveyance of 
CSLI and CSLI is an automatic function created by cell phone providers that customers do not 
participate in.  Id. at 443–45. 
 169. Id. at 429 (“The [service] provider only receives . . . [CSLI] information when a cell phone 
user’s phone exchanges signals with the nearest available cell tower.”). 
 170. See id. at 437–38; see also United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 171. Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–12 (equating the retention of CSLI by a service provider with the 
retention of bank statements or a record of phone numbers dialed). 
 172. Id. at 512 (“The longstanding third-party doctrine plainly controls the disposition of this 
case.”). 
 173. Graham, 824 F.3d at 436 (noting that the defendants raised the same issues as the dissent 
in Smith, but as that did not sway the majority of the Supreme Court in 1979, it cannot sway the 
circuit court in 2016). 
 174. Id. at 435. 
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III.  DUE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY A WARRANT MUST BE REQUIRED TO 
ACCESS CSLI 
A.  The Possibility of a Judicially Created Rule 
It appears extremely unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will decide the 
CSLI issue due to the lack of a circuit split and the near uniform legal analysis 
used by the courts, despite the increasing understanding of how substantive a 
picture CSLI information can provide about an individual’s movements and 
life.175  If the Court chooses to hear a case dealing with the use of CSLI without 
a warrant, it should use the groundwork that was laid in the Jones decision to 
require a warrant supported by probable cause before giving law enforcement 
access to historical CSLI.176  The Katz expectation of privacy analysis clearly 
supports the requirement for a warrant,177 as it can reasonably be inferred that 
there is both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the historical 
locations visited by a cell phone and by extension, its owner.  As Justice Alito 
noted in his concurrence in Jones, the prolonged collection of location 
information about a subject has grave concerns for privacy.178  He noted that 
with the facts presented in the case, the continuous monitoring of a suspect’s 
vehicle with a GPS device for twenty-eight days was unconstitutional.  But he 
did not draw a bright line rule stipulating what, if any, length of time would be 
constitutional absent a warrant.179 
The police in the Graham and Davis cases acquired 221 and 67 days of CSLI, 
respectively.180  Even without a bright line rule, it would appear that the number 
of days of activity examined by the police would violate Justice Alito’s rule that 
four weeks of activity was too long without a warrant.  While it is clear that the 
collection of multiple months of location data is a violation of the Fourth 
                                                 
 175. Tim Cushing, Government Asks Appeals Court to Change Its Mind on Warrant 
Requirement for Cell Site Location Info, TECHDIRT (Sept. 21, 2015, 1:49 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150919/09323432295/government-asks-appeals-court-to-
change-mind-warrant-requirement-cell-site-location-info.shtml. 
 176. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407, n.3 (2012) (“Where, as here, the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such 
a search has undoubtedly occurred.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483, 2485 (2014) 
(concluding that Robinson, which held that no additional justification is needed for a warrantless 
search of a person incident to a lawful arrest, is not extended to the search of cell phones). 
 177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 178. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that while short-term monitoring 
is reasonable, long-term monitoring “impinges on expectation of privacy”). 
 179. Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the line into unconstitutionality was crossed before 
the four-week mark and that police can always seek a warrant if there is any doubt as to the 
constitutionality of their actions). 
 180. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 785 
F.3d 498, 501 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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Amendment based off of Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, it is less clear if 
it is legal to collect any CSLI over shorter periods of time. 
There is a need for a bright line rule that holds that any CSLI sought by the 
police should require a warrant supported by probable cause.  While section 
2703(d) of the SCA requires only a showing of “specific and articulable facts” 
that records are relevant to a criminal investigation,181 the statute should be 
amended to require a warrant supported by probable cause due to the large 
quantity of information that can be derived from historical cell site location 
information.  The word “relevant” can be interpreted extremely broad and not 
necessarily provide the critical level of scrutiny that should be required to access 
CSLI.182 
It is true that there is no expectation of privacy in movements on public 
roads,183 but the ease with which CSLI can be collected requires a heightened 
level of scrutiny.  Additionally, all of the tracking cases dealt with radio or GPS 
transmitters in automobiles.184  While there may be a reduced expectation of 
privacy in an automobile’s movements on a public road,185 it cannot be extended 
to a cell phone acting as a tracking device in an individual’s pocket or purse.  
Cell phone tracking is distinguishable from tracking an automobile or an item in 
an automobile because a cell phone is a de facto extension of the individual as 
evidenced by its ubiquity in everyday life; although, a GPS tracker is much more 
accurate than CSLI relying on cell towers to provide location data.186  The 
                                                 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 182. See Elizabeth Goitein & Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong With the FISA Court, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE 21–22 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
What_Went_%20Wrong_With_The_FISA_Court.pdf (“In its 2013 decision, the FISA court ruled 
that all American’s phone records were relevant to authorized international terrorism 
investigations.”).  In a different context, the use of the word “relevant” in a statute to limit how 
much information law enforcement can access was circumvented by the government when arguing 
in front of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when it sought authorization for the bulk 
collection of metadata.  Id. 
 183. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (noting that a person traveling in an 
automobile over public roads has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements). 
 184. See id. at 278 (beeper in container); compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 
(1984) (beeper in a can), with United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (GPS on an 
automobile). 
 185. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (stating that one generally has a lesser expectation of privacy 
in cars, and furthermore, that a person driving on a public road has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1978) (distinguishing one’s expectation of 
privacy in cars and other places); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976) 
(highlighting the lesser expectation of privacy in cars due to existing government regulations and 
“public nature of automobile travel”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (noting the 
exigency arising from a moving car and lesser expectation of privacy in cars in comparison to a 
building). 
 186. Blaze Testimony, supra note 26, at 51, 53; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2485 (2014) (“Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the 
hands of individuals.  A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the 
type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.”). 
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Supreme Court in Kyllo held that the use of a technological device that is not in 
common usage by the public to explore details of the home previously 
unknowable without a physical intrusion constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.187  Just as a thermal imager in Kyllo provided the police with 
information concerning an indoor marijuana growing operation,188 CSLI can 
provide the police a clear picture of where a person lives in a manner that is not 
available to the public.189 
B.  The Need for a Legislative Solution 
It is likely that a legislative solution will be necessary to regulate the 
acquisition of CSLI.  In both Graham and Davis the courts held that despite the 
unconstitutional collection of CSLI, the police were able to retain the collection 
of information due to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.190  Law 
enforcement in each case relied in good faith on an apparently valid court order 
issued by a neutral magistrate to compel production of CSLI, and in the words 
of the Eleventh Circuit, law enforcement “acted in scrupulous obedience to a 
federal statute.”191  With the passage of CalECPA in October 2015,192 it is 
possible other states will follow suit.  While federal law enforcement will still 
be able to rely on the SCA for access to CSLI without a warrant, a patchwork of 
state laws will make law enforcement’s work more difficult.193  A law at the 
federal level will ensure uniformity among local, state, and federal law 
enforcement. 
Currently, the Court does not appear ready to protect CSLI with a warrant 
requirement, absent some sort of legislative action.  This is quite clear from the 
Jones decision, where the majority applied the tort of trespass to the Fourth 
                                                 
 187. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 188. Id. at 29–30. 
 189. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Taken together . . . Kyllo . 
. . support[s] our conclusion that the government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
it relies upon technology not in general use to discover the movements of an individual over an 
extended period of time.  Cell phone tracking through inspection of CSLI is one such technology.”). 
 190. Id. at 363; United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014).  In United States 
v. Leon, the Court laid out the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which states that if 
police act in good faith on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that is subsequently found not 
to be supported by probable cause, then the evidence obtained by that warrant is not be suppressed 
because there is no behavior on the part of the police that needs to be deterred. United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). 
 191. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1218 (noting that law enforcement followed the procedures laid out in 
the Stored Communications Act to access CSLI as reason not to suppress the evidence). 
 192. In Landmark Victory for Digital Privacy, Gov. Brown Signs California Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act into Law, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL. (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-victory-digital-privacy-gov-brown-signs-california-
electronic-communications-privacy. 
 193. Zetter, supra note 116.  
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Amendment to hold the installation of a GPS tracker unconstitutional. 194  
Moreover, Justice Alito’s concurrence does not provide much support for a 
warrant requirement for four weeks of tracking without a legislative solution.195  
A warrant requirement is necessary to remedy the serious privacy implications 
that arise in the collection of CSLI.  In the foundational third-party doctrine 
cases, the defendants took affirmative actions that shared information with third 
parties.196 
In the Davis and Graham cases on the other hand, merely purchasing and 
carrying a cell phone was enough to grant the government access to months of 
location data.197  It may be prudent of the courts to look to the legislature in order 
to solve the complex privacy issues that arise with cell phones.  Sitting en banc, 
the majority echoed this sentiment in Graham, emphasizing that while the third-
party doctrine controlled in the current case, Congress was free to require greater 
privacy protections in the form of a warrant requirement for CSLI.198  Congress 
should pass a measured piece of legislation that both deals with the current 
privacy issues arising from the use of CSLI and contains flexibility to ease its 
adaption to future methods of communication.  It is possible that Congress will 
address the privacy implications of warrantless acquisition of CSLI soon.  In 
2016, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a warrant requirement 
for the acquisition of stored email communication.199  While the legislation 
languished and ultimately died in the Senate, the broad bipartisan support in the 
House shows the level of concern about electronic data acquisition that exists 
among at least one house of Congress.  Cell phone use is pervasive in our society, 
with 72% of respondents in a study stating that they were within five feet of their 
phones a majority of the time and 12% even admitting that they used their 
phones in the shower.200  The Katz Court reminds us that the Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
 194. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“We have no doubt that such a 
physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
 195. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological 
change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”).  While the Supreme Court does 
not appear ready to weigh in on the CSLI issue, the Fourth Circuit in its Graham decision practically 
begs the Supreme Court to intervene in the issue.  United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 361 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (“If the Twenty-First Century Fourth Amendment is to be a shrunken one, as the dissent 
proposes, we should leave that solemn task to our superiors in the majestic building on First Street 
and not presume to complete the task ourselves.”). 
 196. See Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 440 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
 197. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498, 512–13 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 198. Graham, 824 F.3d at 436. 
 199. Kate Tummarello, The Fight Over Email Privacy Moves to the Senate, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/fight-over-email-privacy-moves-
senate. 
 200. Chelsea J. Carter, Where (and When) Do You Use Your Smartphone: Bedroom? Church?, 
CNN (July 13, 2013, 9:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/tech/smartphone-use-survey/. 
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“protects people, not places.”201  A legislatively created warrant requirement for 
CSLI will accomplish that goal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The courts are legitimately challenged as to how to treat CSLI.  Changes in 
technology always move much faster than the law.  As we come to understand 
how clear a picture of our lives can be discerned solely through accessing CSLI, 
it is important that the courts provide clear guidance that law enforcement must 
seek a warrant before accessing historical CSLI.  The concurrences in Jones 
show us that the Supreme Court is grappling with the novel privacy issues 
related to walking around with a device that, while capable of keeping us 
connected to the world, can also provide significant amounts of information 
about our private lives.  Whether in the courts or in the legislature, it is important 
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to be brought into the twenty-first century 
by protecting historical location data created by a cell phone that is doing nothing 
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